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I.  The Discourses of Disinterest 
 
     The 1790s witnessed a notable transformation in the discourses of disinterest that had 
developed in Britain since the mid-seventeenth century.  To be disinterested was to recognise 
a public interest beyond private interests and to be able to judge impartially between self-
interest and the interests of others.  By treating disinterest as a discourse that began in Britain 
with Hobbes and Locke, rather than with Shaftesbury – as it is more commonly assumed –
one can see the discourses of disinterest in the seventeenth and eighteenth century as an early 
attempt to mediate between the public and the private. 1  One could argue that the modern 
concept of disinterest has tended to be treated either as a discourse of the private sphere (in 
histories of aesthetics) or as discourse of the public sphere (in readings inspired by the work 
of Gramsci, Foucault or Habermas). 2  These modern theorisations of the autonomy of the 
private and of the hegemony of the public are perhaps indicative of “the increasing divorce” 
between “subjectivation” and “rationalization” that Alain Touraine suggests constitutes 
modernity (4).  In his reading of the work of Carl Schmitt, Derrida insists that any discourse 
reliant on a clear and absolute distinction between the public and the private collapses, falls 
into ruins  (107). 3  Arguably, discourses of disinterest are always haunted by the equivocal 
and uncertain demands of both the public and the private.  Traditional discourses of 
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disinterest can be characterised as an attempt to mediate between the different claims of the 
public and the private spheres and the ongoing struggle to find a reasonably stable point of 
equilibrium between them.     
     In the aftermath of the regicide of Charles I, Hobbes argued that the problems raised by 
the private sphere (particularly by the imagination and enthusiasm) and the unstable authority 
of private judgement could only be resolved by a sovereign public authority underwriting the 
rule of reason and the laws of nature.  For Hobbes, the sovereign is the “Publique person”, 
the only effective common judge and public authority that is above and beyond the different 
claims, interests and errors of private judgement (Hobbes 285; Tuck 56-63).  Hobbes defined 
disinterest as a discourse of the public sphere and the authority of the sovereign.  Locke, in 
contrast, had more confidence in an effective public authority residing in the social roles of 
the individual and recast disinterest as a discourse of the limitation of the private sphere 
(Tully 32-33).  In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), he insists that simple 
ideas, the basic building blocks of the understanding, are a finite stock of ideas that are 
involuntarily received from “without us”, and the subject cannot “invent or frame one new 
simple idea” (564, 120).  This foundation of knowledge enables Locke to argue that the 
imagination can be effectively quarantined from the private and the subject tutored against 
the errors and delusions of enthusiasm by the checks and balances of reason and experience.    
     In the eighteenth century, most British moral philosophers would have considered it 
heresy to associate any aspect of disinterest with Hobbes or Locke.  The reaction against 
these writers focused on their belief in the natural partiality and self-interest of the subject 
and their view that disinterest required public structures and institutions to guarantee the 
disinterest of the individual.  The reaction to Hobbes in particular led to a marked emphasis 
in the eighteenth century on the natural origins of disinterest and intensified the attempts of 
thinkers such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to find more reliable grounds for disinterested 
judgement in the private sphere.  Shaftesbury suggested that, within the larger framework of 
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a rationalist natural order, the rational affections and reflection of the subject could play an 
active and positive role in the formulation of disinterested judgement (Darwall 187).  
Hutcheson, on the other hand, turned to Locke's empiricist epistemology for his theory of 
natural disinterest.  He added the ideas of approval and disapproval to the finite stock of 
simple ideas, arguing that they were the foundation of an involuntary natural moral sense.  
With the moral sense as a co-ordinating principle, he suggested that the passions could 
provide relatively stable grounds for disinterest.  Still in the shadow of Locke, Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson also had to contend with a new emphasis on the influence and power of 
custom as a source of both regulative standards and the corruption of manners. 
      Though Hume was more sceptical than his predecessors about the efficacy of natural 
disinterest, arguing that it must be complemented and reinforced by public and “artificial” 
structures, he also insisted that in view of the limitations imposed upon the understanding by 
experience, the imagination plays a crucial role in the constitution of the private sphere.  
Bringing the imagination into heart of ideas of disinterest, Hume concluded that a relation 
between feeling and imagination, guided by custom, could provide a stable ground for 
disinterest (Deleuze 24; Eagleton 47).  Adam Smith in turn broadly accepted Hume’s theory 
of disinterest and reinforced the authority of the sympathetic imagination in disinterested 
judgement.  However, as a result of his concerns about the corrupting influence of custom 
and fashion on the moral sentiments, Smith came to lose faith in the ability of the public 
sphere to provide a reliable framework for disinterest.  In the final revised edition of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in 1790, he suggested that only a private sphere 
independent of the public world could provide a stable point of reference for the general 
standards of disinterested judgement and conduct in society (Smith 131; Dwyer, Virtuous 
Discourse 170-71).  Smith anticipated a growing sense in the last years of the eighteenth 




 II.  Disinterest Under Siege 
 
     In the 1790s many writers felt that the threat posed by the public sphere to the 
disinterested spectator had intensified.  As a result, a new urgency attended efforts to find 
reliable grounds for disinterested judgement in a private sphere independent of the public 
sphere.  
      At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Locke had already expressed concerns about 
the prejudices, errors and delusions that were the result of certain external influences on the 
subject.  After Locke, advocates of natural disinterest such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and 
Smith focused on the power of social customs and conventions to corrupt the moral 
sentiments of the individual.  Shaftesbury notes that a “prevailing custom” can lead the 
subject to  “esteem or admire anything as virtue which is not as such” (Inquiry 306).  
Hutcheson warns that the force of custom often causes the incorrect association of “moral 
ideas” of “worth, dignity, and merit” with the “finer sort of habitations, dress, equipage, [and] 
furniture” (Thoughts on Laughter 61, 66).  Smith similarly observes in the final edition of the 
Sentiments that the corrupting influence of custom and fashion encourages the “disposition to 
admire, and almost to worship the rich and powerful.”  The “great mob of mankind”, he 
concludes, are deluded by what is publicly praised and “gaudy and glittering in its 
colourings” (61-62). 
     Hutcheson and Smith are particularly worried by the influence of wealth, fashion and 
power on the subject.  Their concerns seem to arise not only from the material reality of such 
things, but from the powerful images that attend them: the “finer sort of habitations, dress, 
equipage, [and], furniture” and all that is “gaudy and glittering in its colourings”, raise strong 
feelings of admiration and a mistaken approval in the subject for the vices of avarice and 
excessive ambition.  These striking images of luxury and status appear to have the power to 
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alter and pervert the moral sentiments of the individual; they form a spectacle capable of 
dazzling the spectator, leading him/her into false opinions and errors of judgement. 
      In his Dictionary (1755), Johnson defines spectacle as “any thing exhibited to the view as 
eminently remarkable.”  Spectacle includes remarkable images or “shows” that can pervert 
the moral sentiments and taste of the spectator and generate a corrupt public taste.  
Underlying much of the hostility of eighteenth century moralists and critics to spectacle is an 
anxiety about a public world that appears to be divorcing itself from the subject and yet, at 
the same time, has the power to produce intense subjective effects.  For many writers 
spectacle serves as a locus for fears about the artificial dominating the natural, of the power 
of artifice in society to refashion subjective tastes.    
     The power of spectacle was displayed most unequivocally on exceptional public occasions 
and in the theatre.  Oliver Goldsmith, for example, responded to the plan for a royal 
procession through the streets of London as part of the coronation of George III in 1761 by 
deploring the “Taste” for “Shews and Processions.”  “Such sights”, he argues, “seldom 
improve a nation” because “the gay frippery exhibited on such occasions turns the mind of 
the spectator to false objects of admiration.”  Among the “dreaded effects [of such] 
misplaced admiration”, he warns, is that “the external figure shall dominate the man” (171-
72).  For Goldsmith, spectacle has the power to corrupt the feelings and judgement of the 
spectator to such an extent that he/she will come to value show over substance and elaborate 
artifice over natural sentiment.   
      In the theatres, the spectacle produced by stage technology was almost universally 
condemned by critics in the eighteenth century.  The effect on the audience of the “scenes 
and machines” of the theatrical production, the painted and sculpted scenes and mechanical 
devices used to create extraordinary stage effects and illusions, was characterised by Addison 
as the mere “Art of imposing upon the Spectators by Appearances: ... The Knavery or 
Trickish Part of the Drama.”  These powerful “Artifices” pose a threat to public taste because 
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they generate strong feelings in the audience “not by proper Sentiments and Expressions, but 
by the Dresses and Decorations of the Stage” (Addison I: 180, 178, 177; Heller).  Spectacle 
produces anxiety because it suggests both that the public world is disengaging itself from the 
subject and that this divided public sphere has the power to transform the feelings and tastes 
of the individual. 
     While there were concerns about external influences on the subject throughout the 
eighteenth century, the sense that the power of spectacle posed a problem for discourses of 
disinterest intensified in the second half of the eighteenth century as more attention was given 
to the power of sympathy.  Hume had argued that sympathy could provide a bridge between 
the private and the public spheres.  “No quality of human Nature”, he observes, “is more 
remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than the propensity we have to sympathize 
with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however 
different from, or even contrary to our own” (316).  The emphasis on the role played by 
custom and sympathy in the formation of general standards of conduct, manners and taste 
contributed to the growing perception from the 1760s onwards that the individual was 
vulnerable to the powerful external influences of society.  While the power of sympathy 
might account for the pre-eminence of the social passions and the disinterest of the subject, it 
also reinforced the impression that the moral sentiments and tastes of the individual could 
effectively be refashioned by an ill informed empathy, a misguided imitation, or common 
delusion. 3 
     At the heart of the changing attitudes towards “spectorial sympathy” and sensibility was 
the belief that morality was dependant on the cultivation of taste (Dwyer, Enlightened 
Spectators 97; Todd).  In his revisions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1790, Smith 
emphasises the dangers of excessive sensibility for the disinterested spectator.  Sympathy, he 
implies, can become a liability when the public at large is deluded and seduced by the artifice 
and powerful images of society that force themselves “upon the notice of every wandering 
 7 
eye” (62).  Spectacle was thought to be able to distort the disinterested judgements of the 
individual, to produce inaccurate, partial and false judgements and, consequently, to debase 
public taste.  However, for most of the eighteenth century, spectacle – whether in the theatre 
or as part of an exceptional public event – was not seen as indicative of a problem with the 
public sphere as-a-whole, nor did it seriously challenge faith in common sense reality.  This 
was to change in the 1790s.   
     The French Revolution signified the emergence of a delusion produced in the public 
sphere that was so pervasive it could not be contained properly or grounded in any traditional 
framework, putting in doubt the underlying confidence in a reliable common sense of reality.  
In the context of the revolution, the power of spectacle, both in and outside of the theatre, 
exemplifies a public world that not only seems to be divorced from the subject, but also 
appears to have cut itself loose from tradition.  This new kind of spectacle intensified fears of 
the dangerous effects of sympathy and that external influences would debase subjective 
tastes.   
     Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) illustrates the remarkable effect of 
the French Revolution on the classical discourses of disinterest.  According to Burke, “the 
most horrid, atrocious, and afflicting spectacle, that perhaps was ever exhibited to the pity 
and indignation of mankind” had taken place on 6 October 1789 when the king and queen of 
France were forced by revolutionary crowds to leave Versailles and return to Paris 
(Reflections 159, my emphasis).  This unprecedented and “atrocious spectacle” was iconic of 
the spectacle of revolution that produced “the most important of all revolutions ... a 
revolution in sentiments, manners, and moral opinions” (175).  For Burke, the revolution has 
produced an unprecedented “shock in which manners and opinions perish”, thus weakening 
“the antient permanent sense of mankind” and “general stock of truth” (172, 275, 258).  It is a 
sign of the extent to which the traditional conceptions of disinterest grounded on a reliable 
public sphere were seen to be under threat in the 1790s that Burke concludes his analysis of 
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the effect of the spectacle of 6 October by suggesting that in both France and England “the 
common feelings of man” are in danger of being marginalised.  “As things now stand,” he 
writes, “with every thing respectable destroyed without us, and an attempt to destroy within 
us every principle of respect, one is almost forced to apologize for harbouring the common 
feelings of men” (175). 
 
III.  The Spectres of Disinterest 
 
     In the first of his letters on a Regicide Peace (1796), prompted by the “mortifying 
spectacle” of the “assembled majesty of the crowned heads of Europe waiting as patient 
suitors [for peace] in the ante-chamber of Regicide”, Burke employs the figure of a “vast, 
tremendous, unformed spectre” to represent the growth of a public sphere that has cut itself 
loose from “all common maxims and all common means” (Regicide 206).  For the key 
figures in the traditional discourses of disinterest – Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
Hume and Smith – the spectre was emblematic of the problems that arise for disinterest as a 
result of the delusions of the imagination and the prejudices of custom. 4  Though a prime 
example of what Hume calls “the inveterate prejudices of mankind”, the spectre was a 
delusion that could be managed by the discourses of disinterest (Hume 166).  It posed no 
ultimate threat to the rapprochement between the public and the private promised by 
disinterest. 
     In the late 1790s, the association of the spectre with spectacle produced a very different 
kind of spectre.  Spectres had, of course, appeared as part of theatrical spectacles since the re-
opening of the theatres at the Restoration.  As Fielding remarks in Tom Jones (1749), “the 
whole furniture of the infernal regions hath long been appropriated by the managers of 
playhouses” (549).  However, as Burke's writings on the French Revolution suggest, what 
distinguishes spectacle in the 1790s is the uneasy perception that it portends the possibility of 
 9 
a dramatic break with all forms of tradition.  In discourses of disinterest, the spectre had been 
a problematic, but easily identifiable and, one could almost say, integral part of the private 
sphere.  As a spectacle, the spectre no longer appears as a product of the imagination: it is an 
effect of the artifices, the “scenes and machines” of stage technology.  This spectre is a 
delusion produced in the public sphere.  In light of the traditional associations of the figure of 
the spectre with the world of subjectivity, instances of the spectre as a spectacle in the 1790s 
– such as Matthew Lewis's successful play The Castle Spectre (1797-98), or the popular 
show of optical illusions La Fantasmagorie – accentuate the fears about an unmanageable 
public world that has divorced itself from the subject, a public world that has the power not 
only to refashion individual taste, but to debase and contaminate the private sphere.  
     The Castle Spectre, which opened in Drury Lane in December 1797, was seen by the 
critics of the time as “a pantomimical exhibition of the most extravagant nature” and its 
extraordinary success was taken as an indication of the increasing domination of spectacle 
over drama in the theatre (Morning Herald 2). 5  It is a testament to the impact of Lewis’s 
play that Carlyle was still singling it out in the late 1820s as the most notorious example of “a 
radically bad taste” in the British theatre (“The State of German Literature” 37-38; Life of 
Friedrich Schiller 177).  The Castle Spectre represents the culmination of changes in the role 
of spectacle in the theatre that took place in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.  Thanks 
to the innovations of De Loutherbourg in stage scenery and lighting and the enlargement of 
the theatres, by the late 1790s elaborate and spectacular stage effects had become an 
indispensable part of any successful theatrical production (Nicoll 137-4; Rosenfeld 80-97).   
     The Critical Review observed that the “popularity” of The Castle Spectre was due 
primarily to “the stage effect” and concluded, “We should disapprove this drama, did we 
judge of it only in the closet; but its effects in representation is admirable” (476).  Anxiety 
about the effect on the spectator of this exceptional spectacle conditions its hostile critical 
reception.  According to The Times, The Castle Spectre is “one of the ... most affecting 
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pantomimes represented on the English Stage”.  However, the critic goes on to say, Lewis 
has “failed” in the “real imitation” of the “feelings of humanity” and “seems perfectly 
indifferent” to “the varied struggles of contending passions” and the “emotions of the heart” 
(2).  In a letter to Wordsworth, Coleridge is even more emphatic on this point, observing that 
in Lewis's play there is “no character at all” and “not one line that marks even a superficial 
knowledge of human feelings” (Collected Letters I: 379; Hogle).  Despite these omissions, 
the critic for The Times notes that the play can still “excite the most sympathetic emotions” in 
the audience (2).  Inflamed by fears about the dangerous effects of sympathy, critics of The 
Castle Spectre complain that it has a powerful effect on the imagination and the passions, 
without appealing to the judgement of the spectator (The European Magazine 42).  The 
Castle Spectre is a source of disquiet, therefore, because it raises strong feelings of 
admiration and approval in the public while appearing to be divorced from the foundations of 
moral judgement, sentiment and taste (Miles 24).  
     As James Boaden recalled in 1831, The Castle Spectre was received as “a piece really of 
one scene”: the appearance at the end of Act Four of the ghost of the murdered Lady Evelina 
to her daughter Lady Angela in a sudden blaze of brilliant light and flourish of solemn music  
(Boaden 347; Reno 100-2).  After the first performance, Walker’s Hibernian Magazine 
reported, “We must allow the effect produced by her introduction to be stronger than 
anything of the sort that has hitherto been attempted” (36).  Though the spectre was a great 
popular success, it was condemned by critics.  According to the Analytical Review, the great 
impropriety of the spectre is that it is presented as no more than “an effect produced by the 
spectacle and music”: an innovative product of the latest stage technology.  It is “a spectre 
that stalks over the stage for no purpose”; it “promotes in no degree the progression of the 
drama, or the development of its intrigue” (184, 186).  This spectre exemplifies the power of 
spectacle that has no relationship to the plot, to the narrative, sentiments and beliefs that 
represent the world of subjectivity.  Lewis’s spectre reflects and itself contributes to the sense 
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in the late 1790s of a public world divorced from the subject, that threatens to pervert, 
perhaps even invalidate, the subjective world. 
     The popular Parisian show La Fantasmagorie represents another notable instance in the 
1790s of the transformation of the spectre into spectacle.  The show was apparently first 
presented in Paris in December 1792, revived in 1798 and imported to London in 1801 
(Mannoni 100-4; Robertson; Nicholson).  In contrast to the spectre in Lewis's play, which 
had been played by an actress, the spectres in La Fantasmagorie were entirely products of 
technology.  Combining the concentrated projection of light from the Aragand lamp and the 
painted images on glass slides from the magic lantern, the show added the innovation of 
motion to create the illusion of “moving”, spectral, projected images (Altick 217-20).  While 
Terry Castle has traced the later “internalization” of the phantasmagoria within a wider 
“history of imagination”, it is worth emphasizing that the spectres of La Fantasmagorie  
signified a new and disturbing mechanical means of producing subjective effects 
(“Phantasmagoria” 29; The Female Thermometer).  Divorced from the imagination and all 
the customary signs of the subjective world, these spectres are iconic of a public sphere that 
is both detached from the subject and able to debase and in some way reproduce subjective 
effects.   
     Unlike the spectre in The Castle Spectre, the spectres in La Fantasmagorie were not 
merely objects of entertainment that gave rise to feelings of astonishment and admiration; 
they were also sources of fear and terror (Castle, “Phantasmagoria” 30).  As the review of 
The Phantasmagoria show in London remarks, “the magic lanthorn” producing the “terrific 
figures” was “let down after the disappearance of the light, and consequently unknown to 
most of the spectators” (Nicholson 148).  The source of the fears generated by La 
Fantasmagorie is ultimately the new and “unknown” technology that is capable of creating 
these unprecedented spectral images.  At the heart of the fears about the power of the 
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machine is a deeper anxiety at the end of the eighteenth century about the increasingly 
unmanageable relation between the subject and the public world.   
     By the time Carlyle writes his essay “Sign of the Times” (1829), this anxiety had become 
widespread.  Carlyle suggests that “man’s activity” is determined by a relation between the 
forces of the dynamnical (the inward, the spiritual, and the natural) and the mechanical (the 
outward, the material, and the artificial).  It is “only in the right coordination of the two, and 
vigorous forwarding of both”, that “our true lines of action lie.”  However, he argues, the 
present time has become “the Mechanical Age”, an age in which “there is no end to 
machinery”, and consequently there can be “no right coordination” of the forces of the 
dynamical and the mechanical.  Worst of all, Carlyle warns, “Not the external and the 
physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the internal and spiritual also.”  “Men”, he 
observes, “are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand.”  The mechanical 
has invaded the heart of the dynamical, it “has now struck its roots down into man's most 
intimate, primary sources of conviction” (59-63, 73-74).  In what is perhaps the most iconic 
image of the new sense in the 1790s of the dangers posed by the public world to the integrity 
of the private sphere, a reporter attending La Fantasmagorie insists that he has not only seen 
spectres of the dead that are products of “optical effects”, “I have [also] seen my own image; 
I have seen myself, going, coming, moving in front of me” (Mannoni 103). 
 
IV.  Romanticism and Disinterest 
 
     The Romantics are not usually included in histories of disinterest.  Nevertheless, their 
attempts to invert the hierarchies that had constituted the traditional discourses of disinterest 
can be seen as a culmination of the move of discourses on disinterest in the eighteenth 
century from a reliance on external guarantees to reason, to sentiment and to the imagination.    
 13 
     While spectacle reflects a growing awareness of the divorce of the public world from the 
subject at the end of the eighteenth century, the emphasis in the early nineteenth century on a 
private sphere that is independent of the public world is closely associated with a new 
confidence in an active and autonomous imagination.  A number of the Romantics 
transformed, and arguably brought to an end the classical discourses of disinterest by 
attempting to find grounds for disinterest not in a mediated relation between the public and 
the private spheres, but in the subject.  Smith anticipated this transformation when he 
suggested that a private sphere independent of the public world could provide a reliable 
framework for general standards of disinterested judgement and conduct.  In the Critique of 
Judgement, Kant similarly argued that ostensible “public” judgements of a “general validity” 
are based on a “subjective universality” (54, 51).  Like Smith, Kant suggests that the 
subjective world can legitimate common standards of disinterested judgement. 
     These Romantic writers attempted to find in the subject grounds for uncorrupted cultural 
judgements and a point of reference to distinguish between the artificial and the authentic, 
delusion and reality.  Their confidence in the ability of the subject to provide an anchor for 
society was founded primarily on the conception of the active, creative and authoritative 
power of the imagination.  Hazlitt, for example, argues in An Essay on the Principles of 
Human Action (1805) that a compelling framework for disinterest can be found in the subject 
through the work of the imagination.  
      In his preface to the Lyrical Ballads (1802), Wordsworth provided a canonical 
articulation of the attempt of Romanticism to “counteract” the “multitude of causes, unknown 
to former times, [that] are now acting with a combined force to blunt the discriminating 
powers of the mind” (746-47).  For Wordsworth, the lamentable and precarious “present state 
of the public taste in this country” is reflected in “degrading thirst after outrageous 
stimulation”: spectacle is undermining “the discriminating powers of the mind” (742, 747). 
 14 
     Wordsworth's well-known “endeavour ... to counteract” the threat of the public sphere to 
“the discriminating powers of the mind” is to advocate a new kind of poetry and a new role 
for the poet as “the rock of defence for human nature” (753).  By counteracting the power of 
spectacle, he wants to provide a contrary force that promotes the sharpness, discernment and 
penetration of the subject against those forces that are blunting, dulling, and blurring “the 
discriminating powers of the mind.”  Wordsworth's confidence in this contrary force rests on 
“a deep impression” of some kind of essential accord between man and nature.  There are, he 
says, “certain inherent and indestructible qualities of the human mind, and likewise of certain 
powers in the great and permanent objects that act upon it which are equally inherent and 
indestructible” (747).  It is the privilege of “the Poet” to consider “man and nature as 
essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of man as naturally the mirror of the fairest 
and the most interesting properties of nature” (752).  This accord between man and nature 
provides an implicit resource for the individual to resist the pressures of the public world.  
       The poet’s openness to the imagination – “to think and feel without immediate external 
excitement” – makes him immune to the effects of “outrageous stimulation” and a source for 
the counter attack against the degrading power of spectacle in society (753).  The poet’s 
“greater promptness to think and feel without immediate external excitement” enables his/her 
poetry to provide a ground for a common or general standard of discrimination: the poet’s 
“passions and thoughts and feelings are the general passions and thoughts and feelings of 
men” (753).  It is the poet who is best suited to discern and disseminate this accord, and 
Wordsworth makes it clear that any clear discrimination or possible rapprochement between 
the public and the private must be grounded in the subject. 
      As I have argued, the spectres seen in popular spectacles of the 1790s were dissociated 
from their customary origins in the imagination and passions.  As such, they are emblematic 
of the power of the public world to contaminate the world of subjectivity.  Partly in response 
to such spectacles, the figure of the spectre comes to represent for Blake, Coleridge and De 
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Quincey an alienated or fragmented aspect of the subject.  The belief that these spectres can 
be reintegrated through the power of the imagination is a sign of confidence in the ability of 
the subject to resist the pressures of the public sphere and the possibility of bringing the 
external world into some kind of accord with the internal world. 
     For Blake, Jesus the Imagination represents a faculty that exceeds the bounds of the finite 
system or “ratio” of sense-memory-reason that had previously restricted the work of the 
imagination and the freedom of the subject.  However, as Peter Otto points out, “rather than 
being an end in itself, the freedom of the subject is, for Blake, realised most profoundly in 
that subject's ability to leave his/her constituted worlds and enter into relation with others” 
(“A Sublime Allegory” 16). 6   The Imagination provides a framework in the subject for 
disinterest, understood now as a reality (Jesus the Imagination), beyond the selfish “interests” 
of the fallen self (signified by the Spectre), in which we find our authentic, human selves.  
“He who sees the infinite in all things sees God”, Blake notes, while “He who sees the Ratio 
only sees himself only” (“There is No Natural Religion” E3). 7 
     The figure of the spectre in Blake's The Four Zoas (1796-1807) and Jerusalem  
(1804-1820), exemplifies an anxiety about the influence exerted by the public world on  
the subject (Paley; Otto, Constructive Vision).  As a reasoning power that is “separated / 
From Imagination” and entirely confined to “Things of Memory”, the Spectre represents a 
fragmented and alienated aspect of the subject effectively constituted by past sense 
impressions passively received from the external world (“Jerusalem” 74:10-12, E229; 
Quinney).  From the point of view of the Spectre, the human mind is enclosed “in steel”, 
confined to past impressions, without the active power of the imagination.  The Spectre is 
emblematic of an internalised form of the external world, an internal representative of 
orthodox religion and the status quo (Otto, “A Sublime Allegory).  He is, therefore, a figure 
of suffering, an “Abstract objecting power, that Negatives every thing.”  Alienated from the 
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Divine Vision, the Spectre sees “from the ou[t]side what he before saw & felt from within” 
(“Jerusalem” 10: 14-15, E153; 8: 25, E151).   
     As an internalised form of the external world, the Spectre threatens the freedom of the 
subject by framing and (as conscience) enforcing obedience to “Laws & Moralities / To 
destroy Imagination! the Divine Body.”  Under the influence of his Spectre, Albion hides 
Jerusalem from Jesus, separating human inspiration and freedom from divine vision 
(“Jerusalem” 74: 12-13, E229; 4: 15-16, E146).  Despite the threat posed by the Spectre to 
the subject, Blake argues that the he must be reintegrated, a task that can be achieved only by 
the imagination.  In The Four Zoas, Los embraces the Spectre: 
 
 then the Spectre enterd Los's bosom  Every sigh & groan  
 Of Enitharmon bore Urthonas Spectre on its wings 
 Obdurate Los felt Pity  Enitharmon told the tale  
 Of Urthona.  Los embracd the Spectre first as a brother 
            Than as another Self  
     (95 [87]: 26-30, E367)          
 
Los's actions represents a turning point (albeit, a somewhat ambiguous turning point in  
which Los can be said to have been co-opted by the Spectre as much as having overcome his 
antagonist by embracing him), suggesting that the Spectre can be reintegrated through the 
work and vision of the imagination.  The Spectre now describes himself as a “Spectre of the 
Living.”  He is, in other words, an internal representative of the external world, who 
recognises that he has a “Counterpart” in Los and the hope of reunification in Urthona (84: 
40, E360; 87: 35, E369).  In a world where a “pretence of Moral Virtue” has generated 
oppressive “Laws of sacrifice for Sin” and “Laws of Chastity and Abhorrence”, the free and 
inspired individual provides an anchor for society (“Jerusalem” 36 [40]: 35, E182; 49: 25-26, 
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E198).  For Blake, individuals can find within themselves the resources to combat – and 
perhaps overcome – the pressures the restrictions of the public world. 
     In May 1799 Samuel Taylor Coleridge visited the Hartz Mountains in Northern Germany 
and climbed the Brocken in search of the Brocken Spectre, an optical phenomenon that had 
first become widely known in the 1780s in which observers saw a gigantic reflection of their 
own image in the sky above them (Notebooks I: 430).  The Brocken Spectre is indicative of 
Coleridge’s anxiety about the influence of the external world on the subject and, at the same 
time, of his (sometimes wavering) confidence in the subject’s ability to overcome such 
pressures through the imagination.  The Brocken Spectre appears at first to be part of the 
objective world, without reference to the subject.  This is why the rustic woodsman, 
described in “Constancy to an Ideal Object” (c. 1817-1828), mistakenly “worships” as a real 
spectre the image that appears before him (Poetical Works I: 455-56).  As Coleridge notes in 
his lectures on Shakespeare (1811-1812), when “a man traversing the Brocken in the north of 
Germany at sunrise ... sees before him a figure of gigantic proportions ... he only knows it to 
be himself by the similarity of action.”  The observer initially “sees himself”, Coleridge adds, 
“without knowing that he sees himself” (Lectures I: 352; II: 441, 514).   
     This initial phase of the experience makes the Brocken Spectre a potent symbol for an 
alienated aspect of the subject.   In Aids to Reflection (1825), Coleridge draws an analogy 
between an experience of “alienation”, “inward complexity and contradiction” and that of an 
observer who, rather than recognising his shadow “as a projected Form of his own Being ... 
recoils from it as from a Spectre” (227).  The subject draws back in in fear when confronted 
by a subjective effect that appears to be part of the external world.  For Coleridge, however, 
the Brocken Spectre is only momentarily a source of fear.  The subject soon recognises the 
“gigantic figure” of the Brocken Spectre as his/her own shadow: the Brocken Spectre is an 
effect produced by the subject.  As the poet recognises in “Constancy”, “he makes the 
shadow” (my emphasis).  Coleridge uses the Brocken Spectre to form an “allegory” of the 
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role played by the imagination in shaping the phenomenal world, and of the alien, threatening 
world that emerges if this role is forgotten or obscured.  As his famous definition of the 
imagination in the Biographia  Literaria (1817) suggests, in this allegory, the imagination (of 
God and the observer) becomes a point of reference which allows us to distinguish between, 
on the one hand, the natural and the vital (the products of the primary and secondary 
imagination) and, on the other hand, the artificial and the inauthentic (the products of fancy) 
(Biographia I 304-5).  For Coleridge, the Brocken Spectre is indicative of the often 
problematic but always necessary affirmation of the existence of a private sphere independent 
of the public world that opens the possibility of creating an external world in accord with the 
subject (Rajan 96, 204-59). 
     Nearly twenty years after Coleridge wrote “Constancy to an Ideal Object”, Thomas De 
Quincey devoted a section of Suspiria de Profundis (1845), his fragmentary and rhapsodic 
sequel to Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1822), to “The Apparition of the 
Brocken.”  In contrast to Coleridge, De Quincey implies that the Brocken Spectre is 
emblematic of an alienated portion of the subject which can never fully be reintegrated.  For 
De Quincey, when the observer on top of the Brocken makes a gesture, the spectre “does 
repeat it; but the driving showers perplex the images, and that, perhaps, it is which gives him 
the air of one who acts reluctantly or evasively.”  In the “driving mists”, the Spectre appears 
“to dissemble his real origin” (Suspiria 155-6).  The mist accentuates the subject’s inability 
to recognise unequivocally the Spectre as “a projected Form of his own Being” and adds an 
element to the Spectre's personality not reducible to the subject's imagination (Coleridge, 
Aids 227).    
     De Quincey's narrator invites the reader to “ascend” the Brocken and “to test the nature” 
of the “mysterious” Brocken Spectre.  These tests are prompted by a “fear” that the spectre is 
corrupt and unreliable (153-4).  However, rather than dispelling these fears, the “decisive” 
proof that the Brocken Spectre is a reflex of the subject reintroduces the same doubts.  By 
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“uttering your secret feelings to him”, De Quincey notes, “you make this phantom the dark 
symbolic mirror for reflecting to the daylight what else must be hidden for ever.”  For De 
Quincey, the Brocken Spectre is emblematic of the Dark Interpreter.  Like the mists that 
render the Brocken Spectre an impure and incomplete reflection of the subject, the Dark 
Interpreter, “originally a mere reflex of my inner nature”, mixes and contaminates the 
subjective world with “alien natures.”  The subject is unable to stop the Dark Interpreter from 
exerting a force that sends “drifting the anchors of any vessel.”  Although “a mere reflex” of 
the inner world of the subject, De Quincey notes that the Dark Interpreter “will not always be 
found sitting inside my dreams, but at times outside, and in open daylight” (156-57).  He 
therefore stands as testimony to a non-recoverable exteriority within the subject. 8 
     In a further fragment of the Suspiria de Profundis published in 1854, De Quincey 
illustrates the origins of the Dark Interpreter by referring to the phantasmagoria.  “Perhaps 
you are aware”, he writes, “of that power in the eye of many children by which in darkness 
they project a vast theatre of phantasmagorical figures moving forwards or backwards 
between their bed-curtains and the chamber walls” (“The Dark Interpreter” 7).  As Alina Clej 
remarks, the image of the phantasmagoria, “whether projected by an optical apparatus or 
constructed in symbolic terms, introduces a distance and uncertainty between subject and 
object or between the subject and itself” (xxvii).  Rather than illustrating the operations of a 
natural imagination, by the middle of the nineteenth century the “power in the eye” seems 
closer to the illusions and artifice of La Fantasmagorie.  For De Quincey there is now no way 
of closing the gap between the subject and spectre.  Instead, and as the Dark Interpreter 
implies, this gap is likely to widen. 
     De Quincey’s account of the Brocken Spectre suggests that the subject can no longer hope 
to bring about a rapprochement between the public and the private through the imagination.  
The different spectres that inhabit the works of Blake, Coleridge and De Quincey testify to 
the breakdown of the traditional discourses of disinterest in the first half of the nineteenth 
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century.  The end of the traditional discourses of disinterest is marked not by the emergence 
of a belief in the autonomy the private or, alternatively in the hegemony of the public, but by 
the recognition that it is no longer possible to find an effective point of reference in either the 
public or the private spheres or to make a clear and absolute distinction between the 
subjective and objective worlds.  Romanticism can be seen as both the culmination and the 
collapse of classical discourses of disinterest. 
 
























     Notes 
 
1.  See, for example, such disparate critics as Stolnitz, “On the Significance of Lord     
     Shaftesbury” 98-100; Dickie 12-13; Guyer 48-55; Eagleton 34-36. 
  
2.  It is often assumed that the modern concept of disinterest began in Britain with Lord 
 Shaftesbury.  Consequently, some influential modern theories of aesthetics have 
 characterised disinterest as an exclusive and autonomous discourse of the private sphere.  
 For Stolnitz, drawing on the work on Bullough, “aesthetic disinterestedness” describes
 both a subjective detachment from all practical and social interests surrounding a beautiful
 object, and a “stifling” of all the personal interests of the self (Stolnitz, “The Artist and the 
 Aesthetic” 411).  This clearing of all interests, allows for the subject's disinterested
 attention or attitude to a beautiful object “for its own sake” (Stolnitz, “On the Significance
 of Lord Shaftesbury” 99).  To justify the “autonomy of the aesthetic”, Stolnitz uses
 disinterest to separate beauty from questions of morality and to isolate the private sphere
 from the public (See also “On the origins of “Aesthetic Disinterestedness”).  Though they
 differ from  Stonitz on many important points, Dickie and, to a lesser extent, Guyer both
 treat disinterest primarily as a concept of the private sphere. 
      In contrast to these traditional definitions of disinterest within aesthetics, critics such as 
 Barrell and Eagleton argue that disinterest is exclusively a product of the public world and 
 describes a particular social, economic and political role.  This view of disinterest often 
 relies on readings of Foucault and Gramsci (Barrell 32-35, 44).  Foucault's influential 
 work has done much to distort our understanding of the spectator in the eighteenth
 century, in particular the “disinterested spectator” (see Flynn, Gordon and Miles).  By
 aligning disinterest with Foucault’s notion of a “disciplinary mechanism” expressed
 through an “inspecting gaze” which the individual internalises until he “exercises this
 surveillance over, and against, himself”, disinterest appears to be the result of the
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 individual's internalisation of dominant public norms and rules (Foucault, Discipline and
 Punish 197 and “The Eye of Power” 155).  Following Gramsci, Eagleton defines the
 aesthetic as an expression of hegemony, of an “internalised governance” where consent to
 a dominant ideology is based not on coercion but a “ruling and informing the senses from
 within while allowing them to thrive in all of their relative autonomy”, to the extent that to
 transgress the law “would signify a deep self-violation.”  Though Eagleton adds an
 emancipatory aspect to counter this repression within the aesthetic, he nonetheless echoes
 Foucault in assuming a pervasive  internalisation of the dominant ideology of the public
 sphere (Eagleton 17, 20, 23; see also Gramsci 12, 242, 268). 
          Habermas similarly defines the private sphere through what he calls “audience oriented 
 subjectivity”, a mode in which subjectivity is “confirmed” by rational communication in
 the public sphere (49, 54).  By defining the subjective world in terms of “audience
 oriented subjectivity”, Habermas restricts it to a classical model of rhetoric, namely, of
 ostensibly “private” letters that in fact conform to long-standing “public” rules and
 conventions of (rational) communication.  This, along with the view that the “core” of the
 private sphere is not independent of the public world, leads Habermas to excluded a
 significant preoccupation of many seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers: the
 problem of a private sphere that was independent of the public world (55).  Habermas has
 no room in his work for the imagination, the passions and enthusiasm, that were seen to be
 at the heart of the private sphere.  Habermas's notion of the 'bourgeois public sphere'
 undoubtedly accounts for one of the formations or views of the public sphere in the
 discourses of disinterest, but it cannot account for the attempts of projects of disinterest in
 this period to mediate between the distinct realms of the public and private. 
  
3.  I have explored the question of disinterest in Derrida’s work in “Derrida and the Ruins of
 Disinterest”.  On another significant revival of disinterest in the twentieth century, see my
 “Lévinas, Disinterest and Enthusiasm”. 
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4.  On the complex role played by sympathy in this period, see for example: Wasserman; 
 Slzek, 95-10; Marshall; Dwyer, Virtuous Discourse, 169, 182; Mullan; and Daffon.  
 
4.  See Hobbes 77, 373-74, 441; Locke 396-97; Shaftesbury, Enthusiasm 13, 34-7; 
Hutcheson, Inquiry 82-86; Hume 225-26; Smith 71. 
 
5.  As Linda Colley has observed, in December 1797 the “external and internal tensions” in 
 Britain seemed to be at their greatest.  In the midst of fears of French invasion and the 
 aftermath of the mutiny of the home fleets in June, a royal spectacle was staged to
 celebrate recent naval victories over the French.  Five days after the first performance of
 The Castle  Spectre, 200, 000 people watched as the King went through the streets of =]
 London.  The royal procession broke with tradition by including “250 ordinary sailors and
 marines” in the spectacle.  It is a sign of the anxiety in this period about the power of
 spectacle to corrupt public taste and sentiments that this innovation – introduced by
 George III himself – was criticised in the press for being a “Frenchified farce” and
 following too closely the revolutionary spectacles in Paris (Colley 215-16; Ozouf;
 Russell). 
 
6.  I would like to thank Peter Otto.  He has been a most rigorous and sympathetic reader and 
 this essay owes a great debt to his inspiring, provoking and generous seminars.  I would 
 also like to thank Terry Eagleton for his kind response to an earlier draft of this essay. 
 
7.  All references to the page/plate and line number in Blake's works will be followed by the 
 page number in Erdman's edition.   
 













Addison, Joseph and Steele, Richard. The Spectator. Ed. Donald F. Bond. 5 vols.  Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1965. 
 
Altick, Richard D. The Shows of London. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1978. 
 
Barrell, John. English Literature in History 1730-1780: An Equal, Wide Survey. London: 
 Hutchinson, 1983. 
 
Blake, William. The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake.  Ed. David V. Erdman. 
 Comm. Harold Bloom. Rev. ed. New York: Anchor Books, 1988. 
 
Boaden, James. The Life of Mrs. Jordan. 2 vols. London: Edward Bull, 1831. 
 
Bullough, Edward. “ “Psychical Distance” as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle.” 
 Aesthetics: Lectures and Essays. Ed. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson. London: Bowes and
 Bowes, 1957. 91-180. 
 
Burke, Edmund. First Letter on a Regicide Peace. The Revolutionary War 1794-1797. Ed. R. 
 B. McDowell.  Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991.  Vol. 9 of The Writings and Speeches of 
 Edmund Burke. Ed. Paul Langford et al.  9 vols. 1981-1997.   
 
__________. Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings in certain 
 Societies in London relative to that Event.  In a Letter intended to have been sent to a 
 Gentleman in Paris. Ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien. London: Penguin, 1986. 
 
Carlyle, Thomas. Life of Friedrich Schiller. London: Chapman and Hall, 1899. 
 
__________. “The Sign of the Times. “Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. Vol. 2. London: 
 Chapman and Hall, 1895. 56-82. 3 vols. 
    
__________. “The State of German Literature.” Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. Vol 1. 
 London: Chapman and Hall, 1889. 26-86. 3 vols. 
 
 25 
Castle, Terry. The Female Thermometer: 18th Century Culture and the Invention of the 
 Uncanny. New York: Oxford UP, 1995. 
 
__________. “Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of Modern
 Reverie.” Critical Inquiry 15 (1988): 6-61. 
 
Clej, Alina. A Genealogy of the Modern Self: Thomas De Quincey and the Intoxication of 
 Writing. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. 
 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Aids to Reflection.  Ed. John Beer. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993. 
 
__________. Biographia Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life and 
 Opinions. Ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate. 2 vols. Princeton, Princeton UP 1983. 
 
_________. Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.  Ed. by Earl Leslie Griggs. 6 vols.  
 Oxford: Oxford UP, 1956-1973. 
 
__________. The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Ed. E. H. 
 Coleridge. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1968. 
 
__________. Lectures 1808-1819: On Literature. Ed. R. A Foakes. 2 vols. Princeton: 
 Princeton UP, 1987. 
 
__________. The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.  Ed. Kathleen Coburn and 
 Merton Christensen.  4 double vols. London: Routledge, 1957-1990. 
 
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. London: Pimlico, 1992. 
 
Daffon, Eric. “Double Trouble: The Self, the Social Order and the Trouble with Sympathy in 
 the Romantic and Post-Modern Period.” Gothic Studies 3.1 (2001): 75-83. 
 
Darwall, Stephen. The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740. Cambridge:
 Cambridge UP, 1995. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human 
 Nature. Trans. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia UP, 1991.  
 
De Quincey, Thomas. “The Dark Interpreter.” Miscellanies: Chiefly Narrative. Edinburgh: 
 James Hogg, 1854. 7-12. 
 
 26 
De Quincey, Thomas. Suspiria de Profundis: Being a Sequel to the Confessions of an 
 Opium-Eater. Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and Other Writings. Ed. 
 Grevel Lindop. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. 87-181. 
 
Derrida, Jacques.  Politiques de l'amitié. Paris: Galilée, 1994. Trans. George Collins. Politics 
 of Friendship. London: Routledge, 1997. 
 
Dickie, George. Introduction to Aesthetics: An Analytical Approach. New York: Oxford UP, 
 1997. 
 
Dwyer, John. “Enlightened Spectators and Classical Moralists: Sympathetic Relations in 
 Eighteenth-Century Scotland.” Eighteenth-Century Life 15 (1991): 96-118. 
 
__________. Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century 
 Scotland. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987. 
 
Eagleton, Terry. The Ideology of the Aesthetic. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997. 
 
Fielding, Henry. The History of Tom Jones.  Ed. R. P. C. Mutter. London: Penguin, 
 1985. 
 
Flynn, Thomas R. “Foucault and the Eclipse of Vision.” Modernity and the Hegemony of 
 Vision. Ed. David Michael Levin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. 273-86. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 
 London: Penguin, 1991. 
 
__________. “The Eye of Power.” Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
 Writings 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. London: Penguin, 1992. 146-65. 
 
Goldsmith, Oliver. The Taste for Shews and Processions Deplored. Collected Works of
 Oliver Goldsmith. Ed. Arthur Friedman. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1966. 170-72. 4
 vols. 
 
Gordon, Paul Scott. “Voyeuristic Dreams: Mr. Spectator and the Power of Spectacle.” 
 Eighteenth Century  36 (1995): 3-23. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
 Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1992. 
 
Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. 
 27 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
 Category of Bourgeois Society. Trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence. 
 Cambridge: Polity, 1989. 
 
Hazlitt, William. An Essay on the Principles of Human Action: Being an Argument in 
 favour of the Natural Disinterestedness of the Human Mind. To which are added Some 
 Remarks on the systems of Hartley and Helvetius. The Selected Writings of William 
 Hazlitt. Ed. Duncan Wu. Vol. 1. London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998. 1-82. 9 vols.  
 
Heller, Janet Ruth. “The Bias Against Spectacle in Tragedy: The History of an Idea.” The 
 Eighteenth Cenury 23 (1982): 239-55. 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan; or, The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth 
 Ecclesiastical and Civill. Ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. 
 
Hogle, Jerrold E. “The Gothic Ghost as Counterfeit and its Haunting of Romanticism.” 
 European Romantic Review 9 (1998): 283-92. 
 
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature: Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental 
 Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch. 2nd 
 ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978. 
  
Hutcheson, Francis. An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.  Ed. 
 Peter Kivy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. 
 
Hutcheson, Francis. Thoughts on Laughter and Observation on “The Fable of the Bees” in
 Six  Letters. Intro. John Price Valdimir. Bristol: Themmes, 1989. 
 
Johnson, Samuel. A Dictionary of the English Language. 2 vols. London, 1755. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Judgment. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford; Oxford 
UP, 1952. 
 
Lewis, Matthew. The Castle Spectre. Seven Gothic Dramas 1789-1825.  Ed. Jeffrey N. 
 Cox. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992. 149-224. 
 
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Peter H. Nidditch  Oxford: 
Oxord UP, 1979. 
 
 28 
Mannoni, Laurent, Donata P. Campognoni and David Robinson. Light and Movement: 
 Incunabula of the Motion Picture 1420-1896. Udine: Le gioinate del Cinema Muto, 1995. 
 
Maniquis, Robert M. “The Dark Interpreter and the Palimpsest of Violence: De Quincey and 
 the Unconscious.” Thomas De Quincey: Bicentenary Studies. Ed. Robert Lance Snyder. 
 Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1985. 109-39. 
 
Marshall, David. “Adam Smith and the Theatricality of Moral Sentiments.” Critical Inquiry
 10 (1984): 592-13. 
 
Miles, Robert. “The Eye of Power: Ideal Presence and Gothic Romance.” Gothic Studies 1.1 
 (1999): 10-30. 
 
Mullan, John. Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century 
 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
Nicholson, William. “Narrative and Explanation of the Appearance of Phantoms and 
 other Figures in the Exhibition of the Phantasmagoria. With remarks on the 
 Philosophical Use of common Occurrences.” A Journal of Natural Philosophy, 
 Chemistry, 
      and the Arts 1 (1802): 147-50. 
 
Nicoll, Allardyce. The Garrick Stage: Theatres and Audience in the Eighteenth Century. Ed. 
 Sybil Rosenfeld. Athens: U of Georgia P, 1980. 
 
Otto, Peter. Constructive Vision and Visionary Deconstruction: Los, Eternity, and the 
 Production of Time in the Later Poetry of William Blake. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991. 
 
__________. “A Sublime Allegory: Blake, Blake Studies and the Sublime.” The Eighteenth 
 Century: Theory and Interpretation (forthcoming): 1-24. 
 
Ozouf, Mona.  Festivals and the French Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988. 
 
Paley, Morton D. “Cowper as Blake's Spectre.” Eighteenth-Century Studies  I (1968): 
 236-52. 
 
Quinney, Laura. “Wordsworth's Ghosts and the Model of the Mind.” European Romantic 
 Review  9 (1998): 293-301. 
 




Reno, Robert. “James Boaden's Fontainville Forest and Matthew G. Lewis's The Castle 
 Spectre: Challenges of the Supernatural Ghost on the Late Eighteenth-Century Stage.” 
 Eighteenth Century Life  9 (1984): 95-106. 
 
Rev. of The Castle Spectre. Analytical Review  28 (1798): 179-91. 
 
Rev. of The Castle Spectre. Critical Review 22 (1798): 476-78. 
 
Rev. of The Castle Spectre. The European Magazine 33 (1798): 42. 
 
Rev. of The Castle Spectre. The Morning Herald. 16 December. 1797. 
 
Rev. of The Castle Spectre. The Times. 19 December. 1797. 
 
Rev. of The Castle Spectre. Walker's Hibernian Magazine 21 (1789): 35-37. 
 
Robertson, E. G. Mémoires recreatifs scientifiques et anecdotiques. 2 vols. Paris, 1831-1833. 
 
Rosenfeld, Sybil.  A Short History of Scene Design in Great Britain. Oxford; Blackwell, 
 1973. 
 
Russel, Gillian. The Theatres of War: Performance, Politics, and Society, 1793-1815.
 Oxford: Clarendon, 1995. 
 
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of. An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or 
 Merit. Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc. Ed. John M. Robertson. 
 Vol 1. Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1963. 237-338. 2 vols. 
 
__________. A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm. Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
 Times, etc. Ed. John M. Robertson. Vol. 1. Gloucester; Peter Smith, 1963. 5-39. 2 vols. 
  
Slzek,  R. D. Samuel Johnson and Neoclassical Dramatic Theory: the Intellectual Context to 
 the Preface to Shakespeare. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973. 
  
Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie 
 Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984. 
 
Stolnitz, Jerome. “The Artist and the Aesthetic “in Interesting Times”.” Journal of Aesthetics 
 and Art Criticism 37 (1979): 401-14. 
 
Stolnitz, Jerome. “On the Origins of “Aesthetic Disinterestedness”.” Journal of Aesthetics
 and Art Criticism 20 (1961): 131-43. 
 
 30 
Stolnitz, Jerome. “On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in Modern Aesthetic Theory.” 
 Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1961): 97-113. 
 
Todd, Janet. Sensibility: An Introduction. London: Methuen, 1986. 
 
Touraine, Alain.  Critique of Modernity. Trans. David Macey. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. 
 
Tuck, Richard. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989. 
 
Tully, James. An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge UP, 1993. 
 
Wasserman, Earl, “The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth-Century Theories of Acting.”
 Journal of English and Germanic Philology  46 (1947): 264-72. 
 
Wordsworth, William. Lyrical Ballads, and Other Poems, 1797-1800. Ed. James Butler and 
 Karen Green.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
